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Abstract 
Jan Krajihk posed the following problem: Is there is a generalization result in the theory of 
real closed fields of the form: If A(1 + ... + 1) (n occurrences of 1) is provable in length k for all 
n E w, then (Vx)A(x) is provable? It is argued that the answer to this question depends on the 
particular formulation of the “theory of real closed fields.” Four distinct formulations are 
investigated with respect o their generalization behavior. It is shown that there is a positive 
answer to KrajiEek’s question for (1) the axiom system RCF of Artin-Schreier with Gentzen’s 
LK as underlying logical calculus, (2) RCF with the variant LKB of LK allowing introduction of 
several quantifiers of the same type in one step, (3) LKB and the first-order schemata corres- 
ponding to Dedekind cuts and the supremum principle. A negative answer is given for (4) any 
system containing the schema of extensionality. 
1. Introduction 
In [S], Jan KrajiEek posed the following problem, inspired by a similar problem for 
Peano Arithmetic known as Kreisel’s Conjecture: 
23. (KrajiEek) For the theory RCF of real closed fields, is there a generalization result 
of the form: If there exists an integer k for which 4(1 + ... + 1) (with n occurren- 
ces of 1) is provable in k lines, for all n E N, then V x 4(x) is provable? 
This and similar problems deal with the concept of short proofs, i.e., proofs of 
theorems in a fixed number of steps, in various circumstances, namely relative to 
different axiom systems and relative to different formulations of the underlying 
deductive system for first-order classical ogic. Results in the literature indicate that 
questions about generalizations like the above problem provide a way to distinguish 
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between different proof systems for one and the same theory, i.e., to distinguish 
between formulations which are indistinguishable by model theoretic properties. 
For our present purposes, we first consider the usual system of axioms for real 
closed fields arising from the algebraic analysis of Artin and Schreier [I]. These are 
quantified equality axioms (not the equality schema), the (purely universal) axioms for 
ordered fields, plus 
(‘dx)@y)(x =y5+-x) = y2) (sqrt) 
asserting the existence of square roots, and the infinite list of fo~uias 
(VX*)...(VX&3JJ)(Xe i- x,y f -*. + X2”YZD + yzR+‘f = 0) (zro 1 2n+l 
asserting the existence of zeroes of every polynomial of odd degree. This system is 
denoted by RCF, and its open extension by RCF,,. The language of RCF contains 
= and < as predicate symbols, the constants 0, 1, and the function symbols -,-’ 
~unary) and +, 1 (binary); the language of RCF, consequently contains in addition 
the function symbols Vm (unary), and h 2n+ 1(.xo, .. . , x2,,) (2~ + 1-ary), RCF,, con- 
sists of all instances of the axioms of RCF, in particular of all instances of (sqrt’) and 
(zro;,,+ 1) below: 
~=(~)zv~-~)=~~)z, (sqrt’) 
x0 +x1&+1(x0 *..*,X&)+ .** + 
X2?&+ l&i, ‘.‘, XZn)2n+hz,c*lxo,...,XZn)*n+l =o. @4,+ 1) 
We also add all instances of the following equality axioms: 
X=y=h2n+lh...,X, . . . . X2n)=h2n+l(XO,...,Yt...~XZ”). 
Generalization results are usually investigated for number theories. The principal 
interest of Kraji~ek’s question lies in the fact that RCF has properties which number 
theories do not have, viz., it is complete, and it admits elimination of quantifiers. So 
what can be said about RCF w.r.t. generalization of theorems using only these 
properties? 
One consequence of quantifier elimination for RCF is the following observation: If 
A(xe) is true for a s~~c~e~t~y large xot then (Vx > x0)@) is true. By quant~~er 
elimination, A(x) is equivalent to a quanti~er-Fry J-&&X) which is a disjunction of 
conjunctions of polynomial equalities and inequalities. For x0 sufficiently large and 
the leading coefficient of Pi positive, formulas of the form pi(Xo) = 0 and pi(Xo) < 0 will 
certainly be false. So at least one disjunct must be of the form f, pj(x) > 0, where the 
leading coefficient of every pj is positive. But if p&,) > 0 holds, then it holds for all 
x 2 x0. In fact, the first such x0 can be computed from A(x). 
A second observation is the following: Take the open extension RCF,,: If A(t) is 
provable for every variable-free term t (in the extended language), then (V x)A(x) is 
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provable. This holds, by completeness, because (V x)A(x) is true in the standard model 
of algebraic numbers. 
These two observations put KrajEek’s question in perspective: By the second 
observation, the question would be trivial if instead of the sums of l’s one would ask 
for all terms. So the decisive aspect is which subsets of the set of terms are considered 
for the generalization problem. A more glaring distinction between terms and their 
values will be given in the next section, where we show that all infinite sequences of 
sums of l’s (and even of O’s) generalize, but there are sequences of terms with the values 
of all (natural) numbers which do not. 
We give four answers to Krajicek’s question, three positive and one negative: The 
generalization result holds for 
(1) the standard formulation of RCF with Gentzen’s LK as underlying logical 
system, 
(2) RCF with the calculus LKn (which allows introduction of blocks of quantifiers 
of the same type in one step, instead of single quantifiers) as underlying logical system, 
(3) Dedekind cuts and supremum principles for existentially defined sets and LK,; 
while it fails for 
(4) any axiomatization of the real closed fields including the extensionality schema 
(Vx)(s(x) = S’(X)) 3 r(s(ti), . . . ,s(t,)) = r(s’(t,), . . . ,s’(t,)) 
for r, s, s’, and ti arbitrary terms and n E w. 
Wt) 
The method used to obtain the results is to reduce the structure of the proofs to 
their Herbrand disjunctions. In fact, we want to generalize theorems and not proofs 
per se. One can, however, view the generalization of theorems as a borderline case of 
generalization of proofs, namely where every sound transformation of a proof is 
permitted. In a sense then, generalization of theorems has a similar relation to 
generalization of proofs as model theory has to proof theory. 
2. Calculi, terms, uni~cation 
In the course of this paper we shall work with two logical calculi: The first one is 
Gentzen’s [7] sequent calculus for classical ogic LK. The definition of this system we 
use is standard. The choice of LK over other, in particular, Hilbert-type calculi has no 
bearing on our results, since LK and these systems imulate each other (polynomially 
in the length of the proof; cf. [6, 73). 
For the definition of LK and basic terminology, see [ 121. One convention should be 
explicitly pointed out: Free and bound variables are treated as syntactically distinct. 
They are denoted by a, b, etc., and x, y, etc., respectively. A semi-term may contain 
bound variables, a terlpl contains only free variables. Similarly, a se~i-~~r~u~u may 
contain bound variables only if they are in the scope of a binding quantifier. For 
instance, (V x)A(x) contains the semi-formula A(x) which is not a formula. As might 
be expected, by A(a) we denote the formula obtained from A(x) by replacing x by 
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a wherever x does not occur in the scope of a binding quantifier. The convention 
about free and bound variables is often very convenient (e.g., we do not have to worry 
about terms being substitutable for variables in a formula). When speaking in general 
terms about substitutions, etc., we will use letters from the end of the alphabet to 
denote either kind of variable. It will be clear from the context whether x stands for 
a bound variable or any variable at all. If a definition or a statement applies equally to 
terms and semi-terms, we drop the prefix “semi”. 
LK-Block (LK,) is the logical calculus obtained form LK by replacing the quantifier 
introduction rules by 
A0 1,...,tn)rr-*A 
(Vx,)...(Vx,)A(x,, . . . . x,)T + A vB:left 
and 
I-‘+ A, A(u~,...,u,) 
~-+d,(Vxx,)...(Vx,)A(x, ,..., x,) 
Vjg: right 
and similarly for 3. The variables ai, . . . , a, in (VB:right) and (3,:left) must be distinct 
and satisfy the eigenvariable condition. The case n = 0 is allowed; an actual block 
quantifier inference with n = 0 is called improper. 
The calculus LKB was introduced in [4], where its k-provability problem 
was investigated. LK and LKB are obviously equivalent in terms of provability; 
and block quantifier inference can be replaced by a sequence of usual quantifier 
inferences. 
Proofs in LK and LKs are upward rooted trees of sequents. We define the length 
len(rc) of a proof rc (also: its number of steps) as the number of applications of inference 
rules (of the respective calculus) with the exception of the exchange rule. 
Given a set of formulas (a theory) T, we say that T derives a formula A, in symbols: 
T t-A, if there is a proof (in LK or LKn) of the sequent TO + A where To is a finite 
sequence of formulas in T. If we want to emphasize the calculus or that the proof has 
length <k we write it thus: T & A. We continue with some definitions about terms 
and their measures: 
Definition 2.1. By {s)“(t) we denote s + (s + ‘f. + (s + (s + t) . . . ); 
\ i Y n occurrences of s 
{sf”-l(s). In general, + and . are taken to associate with the right. 
{s>” stands for 
Definition 2.2. With any term t we can associate a rooted, labeled tree T(t) as 
follows: 
(1) If t = c or t = x for a constant or variable, then T(t) is the vertex t by itself. 
(2) If t =f(t1, . . . , tn), and T(ti) has the root vi, then T(t) consists of the vertex j-plus 
the union of T(ti), i = 1, . . . , n, has root f, and edges from fto Vi- 
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Every formula A can be considered as a term in the language which has as unary 
function symbols 1, (V Xi), and (3Xi) (i E o), as binary function symbols A, v, 3 , and 
as constants the atomic formulas. This language, together with additional proposi- 
tional variables, is called the propositional term language. 
Definition 2.3. We say a term s occurs at depth d in a term t if there is an occurrence of 
s in t, and the length of the path from the outermost function symbol of s to the root of 
t in T(t) is n. For instance, (1 + x) occurs at depth 1 in 1 + (1 + x). 
The depth dp(t) of a term is the length of the longest path in T(t). The logical depth 
Id(A) of a formula A is the length of the longest path in T(A’) where A’ is the term 
corresponding to A in the propositional term language. The logical depth of a sequent 
is the maximum logical depth of a formula in it. 
Definition 2.4. A unification problem U is a set of pairs of terms. The depth of U is the 
maximum depth of a term occurring in it: dp(U) = max(dp(s), dp(t) 1 (s, t) E U). 
A solution for U is a substitution 0 s.t. for all (s, t) E U it holds that SQ = to; cr is called 
a unijier. 
Similarly, a substitution p is called marcher for (s, t), if sp = t. 
If a unifier cr for U has the property that, for every unifier (r’ of U, there is 
a substitution 0 s.t. C’ = 80 0 then (T is called a most general unifier for U. 
For first-order languages the problem of finding a most general unifier for U is 
decidable; for the following we will use the algorithm of [9]. 
Lemma 2.5. Let U be a unification problem, w the number of variables in U, u0 the 
number of variables in U which only occur at depth 0, and v = w - vO. Then 
maxdp(Uo) d 2”maxdp(U), where c is any most general unifier for U. 
Proof. By induction on v: For o = 0 the claim follows immediately. So assume v > 0. 
In the first unification step a term s replaces a variable x throughout U, yielding a new 
unification problem U’ with variable counts v’ and vb. 
Case (1): x is a variable occurring only at depth 0. Applying the substitution s H x 
does not increase the term depth, since x occurs at depth 0 everywhere. The variable 
x disappears, and the depths of all other variables remain the same. 
Case (2): x does not only occur at depth 0. Ifs happens to be a variable, the term 
depth of U’ equals the term depth of U. Ifs occurs only at depth 0, then after replacing 
x by s, s does also occur at depth > 0 in U’, i.e., v’ = o and dp(U’) = dp( U). So assume 
s is not a variable occurring only at depth 0. We have v’ = u - 1 and 
dp(U’) Q 2dp(U). Let C’ be a most general unifier for U’. By induction hypothesis, 
dp(U’a’) d 2”- ’ dp( U’). The most general unifier 0 of U produced by the algorithm is 
(T = a’o{s HX}, and U’G’ = Ua. Hence, dp(Ua) d 2”- ‘2dp(U) = 2”dp(U). 0 
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Definition 2.6. A congruence unijcation problem over a propositional term language is 
a pair (V, C> where 
(1) V is a unification problem 
(2) C is a set of sets of pairs (p, A), where p is a propositional variable, and A is 
a semi-formula. For every variable p there is exactly one A and X s.t. ( p, A) E X E C. 
Hence, C defines a partition of the variables in classes; the class [ plc of a variable p is 
the one set X E C s.t. (p, A) E X. 
A substitution r~ together with a congruence partition C’ is a congruence unifier of 
the problem (V, C) if CJ is a unifier of V and the following congruence requirement is 
met. 
Assume {(p,A), (p’, A’)} c XE C and a(p) = t(ql ,..., qJ. Then cr(p’)= 
ttq; , . . . ,qb) where {(qi, B,), (41, Bi)} z [qilc,, t matches with A and A’, i.e., tp = A 
and tp’ = A’, and we have p(qi) = Bi and $(q:) = Bf. 
To simplify matters, we only consider the case where V does not contain variable- 
free terms. The congruence unification problems constructed below all have this 
property. 
The congruence unification problem defined above can be solved by an extension of 
the unification algorithm of Martelli and Montanari, yielding a most general congru- 
ence unifier. It is only necessary to deal with variable elimination: 
Suppose (p, t) E V: If t contains a variable q with (q, B) E [pJ-, then stop with 
failure. This check subsumes the usual “occurs check”, i.e., failure if p occurs properly 
in t. Assume [p& = {(p, A), ( pl, A,), . . . , ( pk, A,)}. Let rl, . . . , rl be all variables in 
t in order of occurrence. In order for the congruence requirement o be met, t must 
match with each of A, Al, . , Ak. So if not, terminate with failure; otherwise, let pi be 
a matcher for t and Ai: tpi = Ai. 
We introduce kl new variables rli, . . , , rli (1 < i < k) and form k variable disjoint 
copies tl, . . . . tk oft by: ti = t[r,i/r 1, . . , rli/rr]. Now replace (everywhere in V) p by 
t and pi by ti, obtaining V’. We partition the set of variables of the resulting unification 
problem into C’ by (1) marking the class [plc as removed and (2) setting 
[r&s = [rj]c u {(rji, pi(rj)) 1 1 6 i d k}. 
By inspection, the above algorithm has the same termination properties as usual 
unification, and has the same bound for the depth of terms. 
3. k-provability for RCF w.r.t. LK reduces to k-provability of finite subtheories 
The likely interpretation of Krajicek’s problem suggests aformulation of the theory 
of real closed fields in a usual logical inference system, such as Gentzen’s sequent 
calculus LK. 
An early result of Parikh shows that the logical complexity of formulas in a proof 
(in LK) can be bounded by a function depending on k and the end-sequent. The 
argument, in modern presentation, uses unification on the skeleton of the proof of, 
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say, T + A. We can extend this result in our setting to show that the logical 
complexity of formulas in a proof of a formula A in RCF can be bounded by 
a function depending on k and A alone. In particular, any proof of A in k steps need 
only use a fixed number (depending on k and the logical structure of A) of axioms 
(zro 2n+ 1). In effect then, we are working in a finite axiom system. For finite axiom 
systems, however, the generalization result always holds. In fact, a stronger statement 
is true: there is always a finite term basis. 
Definition 3.1. A finite set of n-tuples of terms B = {(t;, . , t6)}7= 1 is called a term 
basis for ,4(x,, . . . ,x,)andkEWinatheory Tif 
(1) TF-A(t’,,...,rL) for 1 d i < m, 
(2) if T f A(sl, , s,) (Sj variable free) then there is a substitution G s.t. for some 
i (1 d i d m) it holds that sj = tia for all j, 1 6 ,i 6 n. 
The existence of finite term bases implies a positive solution to Krajieek’s problem 
for RCF, as we will see below. First we show how the degree of the axioms (zroZn+ 1) 
used in a proof of length k can be bounded (by a function depending on k and the 
logical complexity of the formula proved). The proof uses congruence unification. 
Theorem 3.2. Assume T is ajnite set offormulas containing a true closedformula (e.g., 
0 = 0) and T’ = {(ax,) . . . (Qx,)A, 1 n E I}, where I E o is injinite, and the A,, are 
atomic. Let T’ trn denote {(ax,) . . . (Qx,)A. I n E I, n d m>. 
There is a recursive function & s.T. if T u T’& A then T v TG & A where 
T; = T’ 1 &(k, Id(A)). 
Proof. We use an argument similar to Parikh’s [lo], see also [S]. Let n be an 
LK-proof of length k of the sequent T, T; + A, where T; c T’. We construct a con- 
gruence unification problem from II and T, T; -+ A as follows. 
For every occurrence Bi of a semi-formula B in z we have a propositional variable 
p&; a pair in X E C will always be of the form ( pB,, B). For convenience, we define the 
function frm( pB,) = B. The congruence partition will be so that {(p, B), 
(p’, B’)} c X E C means that B and B’ are equal up to substitution of terms for 
bound variables. 
(U, C) is defined as follows: Start by setting U = @ and C = { { ( pB,, B)} 1 Bi is an 
occurrence of B in z}. 
Recursively traverse the proof tree n from the root upwards. At every inference, add 
appropriate term pairs to U and extend the partition C. 
(1) The inference is a weakening: proceed. 
(2) The inference is an exchange: 
17 * A, Bj,, Ais, A’ 
n~A,Ai,Bj,A’ 
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Add to U the pairs (PA,, pAi,), (ps,, pa,) (similarly for left exchange). 
(3) The inference is a contraction: 
Add to U the pairs (pB,, pBj), (pB,, ps,,) (similarly for left contraction). 
(4) The inference is a cut: 
Add to U the pair (ps,, Pi,). 
(5) The inference is ( A : right): 
l7 --) A, Ai* ll -+ A, Bjf 
J7 + A, (Ai A Bj)l 
Add to U the pairs (p (AIABj)iy PA; APB,), (P,Q PA,‘), (PB,, PB,,). The other propositional 
rules are handled similarly. 
(6) The inference is (3: right): 
I7 + A, B(t)j, 
n + A (( 3 x)B(x)jh 
Add to U the pair (p~oXjB(XJ,Ji, (~x)P,,,)~). Change C by adding the class 
C PB(t)j’IC ” C PB(x),IC and by subsequently deleting [ pB(rj,,]c and [ pBcx),]c. The other 
quantifier rules are handled similarly. 
(7) If an axiom Bi + Bj is reached, then add to U the pair ( pB;, pB,). 
(8) At every inference, do the following: If Di and Dj are corresponding occurrences 
of sub-semi-formulas of side formulas in the conclusion and a premise, respectively, 
then add to U the pair (pD,, pDj). 
Clearly, ?I: itself defines a congruence unifier 8 for (U, C), via e( p&) = B (where Bi is 
an occurrence of the semi-formula B in rc). So (U, C) has a solution. 
Let (c, C’) be a most general congruence unifier of (U, C). Write down the 
structure TC’ obtained from rc by replacing every form da occurrence in n by its 
corresponding propositional variable, and apply r~ to it. Let t, tl , . . . , t,, be those terms 
in the end sequent of rc’ corresponding to A and Al, . . . , A,, respectively, where 
T = {A,, . . ..A.}. 
(1) Match t with A and ti with Ai: t,u = A and tpi = Ai. Replace the variables in t, ti 
according to ,u, pi. (2) Perpetuate the replacement of variables by semi-formulas 
throughout 7~‘: If p is replaced by the semi-formula frm( p), and ( p’, frm( p’)) E [p&,, 
then replace p’ by frm( p’). (3) Replace all remaining variables by (0 = 0). (4) remove 
all quantifier introductions which introduce dummy quantifiers to formulas (0 = 0) 
introduced in (3). 
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Clearly, the resulting structure is indeed a proof. Furthermore, the number of 
variables in U which do not only occur at depth 0 is d 2k (in the construction of U, at 
most 2 variables occurring at depth 1 were introduced per inference). By Lemma 2.5, 
the maximal logical depth of a formula in n’ is bounded above by 
1 = 22kmax(ld(T), Id(A)) = &(k, Id(A)), so in particular it is independent of T;. 
Now consider the part T; of the end sequent of rc’ corresponding to T; : A formula 
B in T; can be of one of two forms: (1) B E T;, i.e., B = (ax,) . . . (Qx,)A, for some n. 
This can be the case only if Id(B) d I, hence n 6 1 and therefore B E TA. (2) B 3 (0 = 0) 
(dummy quantifiers were already removed). Since (0 = 0) E T, the end-sequent (up to 
exchanges and contractions) is contained in T u TA; the length of 7~’ is <k. 0 
The reader can now see the motivation for the definition of a congruence unification 
problem. The basic idea of the preceding proof is to rewrite the given proof in its most 
general form, so to speak, by replacing the formulas occurring in it by propositional 
variables. The unification problem defined ensures that only connectives and quanti- 
fiers which must occur in the more general proof (because they are introduced at an 
inference rule) do occur. It rules out the possibility that a given end-sequent could only 
be proved by introducing arbitrarily complex formulas in the axioms or using 
weakenings, which disappear in cuts elsewhere in the proof. Were we only dealing 
with propositional proofs, Parikh’s result could be obtained using conventional 
unification. The slightly problematic case is that of the quantifier rules, where the 
auxiliary formula in the premise is not a literal subformula of the principal formula in 
the conclusion, but only modulo the term structure. Hence, we cannot use the same 
propositional variable for, say, B(t) and B(x). Congruence unification is designed to 
take care of that. 
In what follows, we abbreviate the tuple x1,. ,x, by x. 
Theorem 3.3. If T is a$nite theory containing only prenex formulas, then T has jnite 
term bases for all prenex A(x) and k. 
Proof. Let s be some n-tuple of terms. If A(s) is not provable in length k for any s then 
we can take B = 8. So assume that T t A(s), i.e., LK p T + A(s). By Theorem 3.2 there 
is a proof n of T + A(s) containing only formulas of logical depth < 1’ = &(k, Id(A)). 
In particular the maximal degree (number of logical symbols) of a cut formula in rr is 
d 2”. By cut elimination we obtain a cut-free proof n’ of the same end-sequent from 
atomic axioms of length 2$ = 1. We skolemize this proof to obtain a proof rcs (of the 
same or lesser length) of T, -+ A,(s), where T, and A, are the skolemized variants of 
T and A, respectively. See [2] for how to skolemize a proof in situ: rr, contains the 
skolemized versions of the formulas occurring in n’. In particular, it contains no 
strong quantifiers, and rc, differs structurally from 7~’ only insofar as the (redundant) 
strong quantifier inferences have been removed. Using the Midsequent Theorem we 
obtain an Herbrand sequent; the length of this Herbrand sequent is also < 1; w.1.o.g. 
we can assume that its length on either side equals 1. Assume that 
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T,=((v~yi~)...(v~yi,, B(Yi~~...,y,)}iandA~(~)=(~~~).~~(~~~)A’(z~,...,z~,x)[s/x]. 
Then the Herbrand sequent H has the following form: 
(B(ti’, 2 . . . ) ti’,i))i, . . . ) (B(tf,) . . . ) tfq,))i + A’(Si) . . . 9 Siy S), . . . ) A’(S:) . . ) Shy S) 
Modulo the usual interpretation of a sequent, H is a propositional tautology. Every 
atomic formula defines a propositional variable. Now consider the following (semi-) 
sequent H’: 
Wyii, . . . ,yi’,,))i,...,(B(Yfl,...,yi,,))i4A(z:,...,z~,x),...,A(z:,...,z~,x). 
Define a unification problem as follows: Assume P(rr , . . , r,) is an atomic formula in 
H, and let Pi(Uil , . . . , Uim) be all corresponding atomic formulas in H’. Then set Uij = rj. 
In other words, equate two atomic formulas in H’ if the corresponding formulas in 
H are identical. Clearly, this unification problem is solvable, since H defines a solu- 
tion. Hence, there is a most general unifier 0. Furthermore, H’d is a tautology for any 
substitution 0. Now let s* = G(X). H’o is a propositional tautology, so T -+ A@*) is 
provable. Furthermore, the depth of s* depends only on k and A(x). Also, s = s*fI for 
some unification 8. 
Starting from s s.t. A(s) is provable in k steps, we have founds* s.t. A(s*) is provable 
and s is a substitution instance of s*. But s* did not directly depend on s, rather on the 
Herbrand sequent obtained from the skolemized proof. In other words, every s where 
A(s) is provable in k steps is a substitution instance of some s* obtained from some 
Herbrand sequent of the skolemized end-sequent of length 61. But there are only 
finitely many Herbrand sequents, so there are only finitely many s*. The set of all of 
them gives a finite term basis. 0 
A way to find the term basis is writing down a semi-sequent of the form given by H’, 
and partitioning the atomic formulas with the same leading predicate symbol. If the 
unification problem arising from such a partition has a solution g, H’a is a proposi- 
tional tautology, and a(x) contains no Skolem functions, then O(X) is an element of the 
term basis. 
A different method of obtaining the above result would be to use unification over 
a cut-free proof skeleton; cf. [8]. Its advantage is that the structure of the original 
proofs is not changed as drastically as in our approach (by cut-elimination and 
skolemization); its disadvantage is, however, that it is prima facie much harder to 
calculate all realizable cut-free proof skeleta than it is to calculate all Herbrand 
disjunctions. 
Corollary 3.4. Assume that RCF & A({ l}“) fir some k and each n. Then 
RCF tea. 
Proof. A(t) is logically equivalent o some prenex formula A’(t), and the equivalence is 
provable independently oft, say, in k’ steps. So if RCF &A(t), then RCF &$ A’(t) By 
Theorem 3.2, RCF,, t!$ A’({ l}“) f or all n and a finite subtheory RCFo c RCF. By 
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Theorem 3.3, there is a finite term basis for A’(x) and k + k’. Since every term of the 
form 1 + ... + 1 must be a substitution instance of a term in the basis, one of the basis 
terms must be of the form 1 + ... + 1 + a = {l}“(a), for a free variable a. We have 
RCF,t&‘((l)“(4), h ence also RCF h A’({ l}“({( - l)}m(a)). Since RCF also proves 
A’({ I}“‘({( - l)}” + a)) -+ A’(a)++A(a) we have RCF b(t/ x),4(x). 0 
We see that the generalization depends on the structure of the terms alone and not 
on their values, for the generalization result also holds for (1) the sequence (0)” and 
(2) any infinite subsequence of {l}” or {O}“. Still, it is an interesting question how far 
the relations between large terms and terms with large values go. 
Definition 3.5. An infinite sequence of terms Si in 0, 1, -, +, . is a notation for 
numbers, if every n E w is the value of some si. 
For the general case of notations, Krajicek’s question has a negative answer: There 
are number notations where A(si) is provable in k steps for all i E w, but (Vx)A(x) is 
false: Take for A(x) E x 2 0 and for si = ({l}“)’ + ({ l}*l)’ + ({ 1)“)’ + ({l>“l)‘, where 
(Ui, bi, ci, di) enumerates all of w4. By Lagrange’s Theorem, every natural number is 
the sum of four squares, so si ranges over all of w. Furthermore, RCF proves that 
a sum of squares is not negative, i.e., RCF I-( V x1) . . (V x,)(x: + xi + x: + xi 2 0). 
Hence, RCF p si > 0 for some fixed k. 
We recapitulate a remark made in the introduction: If A(s) is true for terms s of 
sufficiently large value, then it is true for all terms with larger value. This is in contrast 
to the following result, which holds in any number theory N strong enough to 
formalize MatiyaseviE’s theorem, e.g., IZ,. 
Proposition 3.6. For every recursive formula A(a) which is true for all natural numbers, 
there is a notation for numbers si in 0, 1, +, 1, s.t. N p A(si) for all i and some k E w. 
Consequently there is un A(a) s.t. N p A(s,) for ull n but N f(3 y)(\dx)(x 2 y 3 A(x)). 
Proof. By MatiyaseviE’s Theorem we have N E(3z)d(a, z) = d’(a, z)wA(u) (d and d’ 
are polynomials containing only 0, ‘, +, .). Define 
~(a, c) = a.(1 : [(d(a, c) I- d’(a, c)) + ((d’(a, c) 1 d(a, c))]). 
First, observe that N t-A(v(u, c)): N Ev(a, c) = 0 3 A(v(a, c)), since N EA(0). 
N t-v(a, c) # 0 = A(v(a, c)), because N k-o@, c) # 0 I d(a, c) = d’(a, c) and 
N kd(a, c) = d’(a, c) I (A(a) A ~(a, c) = a). 
By assumption there is, for true recursive A(u) and for each n, a solution g,, to the 
Diophantine representation for A(a). Define s, = v({ l}“, 8.). By definition, s, has value 
n. Take for A(a) the formula 1 Prf(a, [O = 1 I), w h ere Prf is a proof predicate for N. By 
the Incompleteness Theorem, (3y)(V x)(x > y I A(x)) cannot be provable. 0 
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4. Intr~uction of blocks of quantifiers: using zeroes of arbitrary ~iynomials 
We have seen in the last section that generalization results hold for the theory of 
real closed fields, simply because in k steps an LK-proof can make use only of zeroes of 
polynomials with degree bounded in k. This, however, is counterintuitive. The length 
measure of a proof should take into account which, and how many axioms are used, in 
particular how many zeroes-of-polynomial axioms, but not the degree of the poly- 
nomials themselves. Any mathematician would feel equally entitled to the use of all 
axioms (zroZn + 1 ). One way to overcome this problem would be to replace (zroZn + 1) by 
the formulas (3y)y2”+’ -I- tzny2” + a.. + tl y + t,, = 0, where the ti are arbitrary 
terms. This option has serious drawbacks, however. These instances of the zeroes 
axioms cannot be used in the familiar way to formulate lemmata, etc., in a fixed 
number of steps. In particular, not even (zro 2n+ I ) is provable in a fixed length 
independent of n. 
To do better justice to the above requirement, we can work, instead of in LK or 
a similar system, in a calculus where sequences of quantifiers of the same kind behave, 
w.r.t. proof length, like one quantifier. Such a system is LKu. 
Parikh’s argument goes through for LKB relative to a modified measure of logical 
depth. 
Definition 4.1. The Jlat depth ldb(A) of a formula A is the logical depth of A where 
sequences ofquantifiers of the same kind count only like one quantifier. More precisely: 
(1) Id*(A) = 0 if A is atomic, 
(2) ldb(A) = 1 + ldb(A1) if A = lAi, 
(3) Idb(A) = 1 + max(ldb(Al), ldb(A2) if A = Al * A2 for * E ( A, v, 3). 
(4) ldb(A) = 1 + ldb(A1) if A = (ax,) . . . (Qx,)Ai and Al does not start with (Qy) 
(Q E {X 3 1,. 
Definition 4.2. A formula occurrence A @es rise to a formula occurrence A’ in 
a proof 7~ if there is a sequence of formula occurrences A = B1, . . . , B, = A’, where 
Bi+ 1 occurs in a sequent immediately above Bi and is either the principal formula of 
an introduction with auxiliary formula Bi or is obtained from Bi by repetition or 
exchange. 
Definition 4.3. An LKa-proof 7~ is simple provided it satisfies the following properties: 
(1) If a formula occurrence A in ?I contains a string of quantifiers of the same type, 
then no proper substring thereof is the string of quantifiers introduced at some 
quantifier inference acting on a formula occurrence that gives rise to A. 
(2) No quantifier inference is improper. 
(3) All eigenvariables are distinct (regularity). 
Proposition 4.4. Let 7c be an LK,-proof of the sequent r + A. Then there is a proof 16 of 
r + A which is simple and fen@‘) < 2len(a). 
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Proof. We construct rc’ as follows: First we rename eigenvariables to ensure regular- 
ity. Take some occurrence of a formula A = (V xi) . . . (Vxn)A’ on the right side of 
a sequent in x, where the V-string is maximal, i.e., (a) A’ does not start with V and 
(b) no proper V-introduction rule is applied to A below the occurrence considered. 
Consider the tree T of formula occurrences in n with vertices the formula occurren- 
ces which give rise to A, and which are subformulas of A but not of (instances of) A’, 
and with an edge between B and B’ if B gives rise to B’. This tree branches only at 
contractions, its leaves are either axioms, weakening formulas, or subformulas of A’, 
and if it contains the edge (B, B’), then B = B’ or B’ is obtained from B by a (V : right) 
introduction. We now alter 7~’ as follows: Let ai,. . . ,a, be new free variables. If 
(‘d Xi) . . . (\J x,) A” is a leaf in an axiom, replace that axiom by 
A”’ + A”’ 
(~Xi)...(VX,)A”-,A”’ 
V : left 
where A”’ = A”[ai/xi, . . . , a,,/~.]. In the graph T there are several vertices which are 
premises to bottommost (V : right) inferences, i.e., there are no other (V : right) inferen- 
ces between them and the root A (there are essentially only contractions). Replace all 
occurrences of formulas in the subtrees ending in such vertices by A’[bi/xi, . . . , b,/x,], 
and replace free variables as needed to obtain a correct proof. Change the bottommost 
(V : right) inferences o as to introduce the entire string (V x1). . . (V x,); the other 
inferences are now improper. The eigenvariable condition for the bottommost V- 
introductions are satisfied, since they were satisfied even already further above in the 
original proof. 
Now consider the case of A = (3x,) . . . (3x,).4’ occurring on the right side of some 
sequent, where the g-string is again maximal, and define the graph T as above. Let 
ai, , a, be new free variables. If (3 Xi) . . (3 x,)A” is a leaf in an axiom, replace that 
axiom by 
A”’ + A”’ 
A”‘+(3~,)...(3x,)A’ 
3: right 
(3xi)...(3x,)A” +(3x,)...(3x,)A ‘Ileft 
where A”’ = A”[ai/Xiy.. . , an/x,]. Then consider a topmost (3 : right) inference in 77 
Replace all occurrences of formulas in T below this inference by A. This changes all 
(3 : right) introductions below this topmost one to improper inferences. Since this is 
done on every branch, contractions are still correct. Eigenvariable conditions cannot 
be violated by this modification, since potential eigenvariables are only replaced by 
bound variables earlier in the proof. 
Similar considerations apply to (3: left) and (V : left). Note that the modification of 
axioms does not interfere with the modifications for another occurrence of the same 
formula. After these modifications have been performed, property (1) holds. Now 
delete all improper quantifier inferences and rename eigenvariables to obtain (2) 
and (3). 0 
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Theorem 4.5. Let 7t be a simple LKB-proof of length k of the sequent r --+ A. Then there 
is a proof n’ of r + A with the same skeleton as n, and the flat depth of formulas 
occurring in 1-6 is bounded above by 2kldb(T + A). 
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 with the following modifications to 
accommodate the block quantifier inferences. We augment the propositional term 
language by second-order monadic quantifier variables of two types, denoted qV and 
q3. The unification problem is obtained from a simple proof, and so we can restrict the 
solutions so that (a) no two quantifier variables of the same kind immediately follow 
another, i.e., every quantifier variable corresponds to a maximal string of quantifiers 
of the same type, and (b) every quantifier variable has as a solution a non-empty string 
of quantifiers. The quantifier variables are unified as follows: 
(1) p = go(t): as in variable elimination 
(2) go(t) = (QxI ) . . . (Qx,)s, where s does not start with (Qy): replace qa( .) through- 
out by (ax,) . . . (Qx,)( .). 
(3) go(t) = q&(t’): replace qa( .) throughout by qb( .), and add the equation t = t’. 
(4) all other cases: not unifiable 
Cases (1) and (2) are justified by (a) and (b) above (note that go(t) = qh(qk(s) cannot 
occur); and (b) justifies that - as (4) dictates - qv(t) = q3(t’), go(t) = 1s and 
qa(t) = s * s’ (* E (A, v, x}) do not unify. We construct a (monadic second-order) 
congruence unification problem U from 7c in the propositional term language ex- 
tended by qV and q3 just like in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We only give the case of the 
block quantifier introductions. 
(4’) The inference in 3,: right: 
Il + A, A(t,, ... 3 t,)j, 
n-,n,((3x,)...(3x”)A(x,,...,x”)j)i 
Introduce a new second-order variable qV, and add to U the pair 
( PWMW,),, q3( PAW,)). Add [P A(,),.Ic u C P~(+Ic to C and subsequently delete [ PAW~,IC 
and CPAW,IC. 
Clearly, the proof 7c again defines a solution to the congruence unification problem U. 
The unification algorithm terminates and gives a substitution (r of which rz is an 
instance; this is easily seen by inspection of the algorithm. As before, define n’, 
mapping leftover propositional variables to a formula, say (0 = 0). In addition, g maps 
quantifier variables to the corresponding actual string of quantifiers in rr. For the flat 
depth of 0, the same bound holds as for usual unification. 0 
,Lemma 4.6. Cut elimination holds for simple LKn-proofs, and the bound (w.r.t. ldb) for 
the cut-free proof is the same as for cut elimination in LK. 
Proof. By inspection of the proof for LK. The critical step is the reduction of a cut 
formula which is introduced by two quantifier inferences. Since the proof is simple, the 
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same quantifiers are introduced on the left and right side above the cut, and can be 
reduced as usual. 0 
Corollary 4.1. There areflnite term bases for any$nite prenex theory w.r.t LKB. 
Theorem 4.8. There are finite term bases for RCF w.r.t LKs. 
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Again, we consider a proof n of 
T + A(s) of length k, where T c RCF is finite. By Theorem 4.5, we know that there is 
a bound on the flat depth of all formulas in rc. By Lemma 4.6, there is a cut-free proof 
TC’ of length k’, and k’ is bounded by a function in k and A(x). By the Midsequent 
Theorem adapted to LKB we obtain a Herbrand sequent from the skolemized proof, 
and we construct he unification problem as before. The only obstacle is now to obtain 
a bound on the depth of the terms substituted into the position x to be generalized, 
since the depth of terms in T can be arbitrarily large. However, all large terms in Hi 
are of the very specific form of the polynomial zeroes: 
YO +y,h(yo,...,y2,) + ... +y,,h(yo,...,~2,)~“+ h(yo,...,~2,,)~~+~ =O 
Now consider the following depth measure for terms t in the language of RCF,,. 
Color a branch in the term tree T(t) if it passes through a function symbol h,,, 1 for 
the zero of a polynomial. The Jlat depth of an occurrence of a term s in t is the depth of 
s in t if t is not colored at all, 0 if s itself is colored, and otherwise the length of the 
uncolored part of the path from s to the root, minus 1. The flat depth dpb(t) oft is the 
maximum flat depth of a constant or variable in t. For instance, in (1 + sr) + h(1, s2), 
sloccurs at depth 1, and s2 occurs at depth 0. 
By inspection of the proof of Lemma 2.5 we see that the same bound holds for the 
language of RCF,, w.r.t. dpb as for the ordinary term depth. As is easily seen, (1) the 
large terms above have flat depth 0, in particular, all variables in them occur at flat 
depth 0, and (2) dp(t) = dpb(t) if t does not contain a symbol h,,, 1. Hence, dp” a(x) is 
bounded above by a function depending only on k and A(x). We have 
dpb o(x) = dp a(x), since s is a tuple of terms in the original language, and therefore 
does not contain hj. By the same argument as before we have a finite term basis for 
RCF. 0 
Observe that here, however, the computation of the term basis is not effective, since 
there are infinitely many possible Herbrand sequents (with the same flat term depth 
but increasing real term depth). Furthermore, there are no term bases if the language is 
extended to include all the function symbols of RCF,,. The following result holds 
nevertheless: 
Corollary 4.9. RCF,, has finite term bases w.r.t. LKB for terms from the language 
restricted to the language of RCF plus fi and jinitely many h2,+, . 
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Proof. For proofs containing the equality axioms for hzn+ 1, the argument of the proof 
goes through, since variables occur only at flat depth 0 there. Axioms (sqrt’) and 
(zro;,,+ i) for the finitely many h 2n+l are treated like the other axioms in the finite 
part T. c] 
Consequently, Krajitek’s question has a positive answer for RCF and RCF,, w.r.t. 
LKB (cf. Corollary 3.4). 
5. Generalization for axiom schemata 
Alternative approaches to axiomatize the reals are Dedekind cuts and supremum 
principles. (A Dedekind cut is a partition of lR into two disjoint sets A and B s.t. 
A Q B. The corresponding axiom says that for every such cut, there is an x s.t. 
A < x ,< B.) These principles are, of course, second-order fo~ulations. The corres- 
ponding first-order schemata re complete for the theory of real closed fields. These 
are as follows: 
3 (3x)(Vz) [(A(z) 3 2 < x) A (B(z) 3 x < z)] &-fed) 
(3X)+) A (3x)&(X) = (3x1 [&(x) A (v’)&(Y) = X G Ylv (sup) 
(3x)C(x) = (~x)(VY)[~c(Y) = @c(x)Ax G YII, (sup’) 
where B,-(x) E (V z)(C(z) =) z < x) (x is an upper bound for C). 
We will see that all these schemata re equivalent in a strong sense, even if restricted 
to existential A and C: Whenever we can prove something with one of them in k steps, 
we can prove it with one of the other two in 4(k) step in LKB (not in ILK, however). 
Proposition 5.1. The axioms for orderedfields with (sqrt) plus (sup) with quantijer free 
C gives an axiomat~zatio~ of the theory of real closed fields, denoted RCF,,,. 
Proof. It suffices to show that (sup) implies the existence of zeroes for every poly- 
nomial of odd degree. Take for C(x) E p(x) < 0, where p(x) is a polynomial of odd 
degree. The hypotheses of (sup) are satisfied, so (sup) provides a least upper bound 
x0 of C. It can be shown using the binomial theorem that if p(xo) < 0 there is an E > 0 
s.t. p(xo + E) < 0 (so x0 is not an upper bound) and that if p(x,) > 0 there is a 6 > 0 st. 
p(xo - a) > 0 for 0 < E < 6 (so x0 is not the least upper bound). Hence, p(xo) = 0. c] 
Proposition 5.2. (1) The schema (ded) with existential A derives (sup) with existential 
C in a fixed ~~rnber of steps im LKB. 
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(2) The schema (sup) with existential C derives (ded) with existential A in a$xed 
number of steps in LKB. 
(3) The schemata (sup) and (sup’) derive each other in ajixed number of steps in LKB. 
Proof. (1) Let C(x) = (3z)C’(x, z) and suppose (3x)C(x) and (3x)(&(x)) hold. Define 
A(x) ~((3~)(3zJ(C’(z,z)~x <z) and B(x)~(Vz)(‘vz)(C’(z,z) ~zdx). B(x) defines 
the set of all upper bounds of C, and A its complement. By the assumptions, (3x) A(x) 
and (3x)B(x) hold; by the dichotomy of 6 we have (V x)(A(x) v B(x)); by transitivity 
we get (V x)(V y)@(x) A B(y) 2 x < y). We can apply (ded) and obtain an x0 with 
A d x0 d B. Since A < x0, x0 is an upper bound of A; since x0 < B, x0 is the least such 
bound. 
(2) Let C G A and suppose the hypotheses of (ded) are satisfied. Then also the 
hypotheses of (sup) are satisfied for A, so there is a least upper bound x0. Clearly, 
A < x0 and also x0 d B, since every z s.t. B(z) is an upper bound of A. 
(3) (sup) simulates (sup’): If (3x)Bc(x) is false, then both schemata re obviously 
true. Otherwise we obtain (3x) [B,(x) A (V y)(B,(y) I> x 6 y)] from (sup). We obtain 
(sup’) by shifting the quantifier (V y) outside, and applying the tautology 
AA(BxC)XBX(AAC). 
(sup’) simulates (sup): Assume the hypotheses of (sup). By (sup’) we obtain (3x)D, 
where D = (V y) [B,(y) I (B,-(x) A x < y)]. This implies (3x)@ A D). D implies 
D’ = ( 3yBc(y) =I (B,(x) A (3y)(x < y)), where the antecedent is among the hypotheses, 
and the second part of the consequent is simply true, leaving only B,(x). On the other 
hand, D also implies D” z (V y) (B,( y) 2 x 6 y). 
Note that the arguments above can all be formalized schematically, and since we 
work in LKB, the length of the quantifier prefixes (32) of C has no influence on the 
proof length. Hence, the proof length is independent of C. 0 
From the preceding proposition it follows that, for purposes of generalization, 
we need only consider one of the above schemata. We will restrict attention therefore 
to (sup’), which has a striking similarity to the least number principle in number 
theory. 
Theorem 5.3. There are finite term bases for RCF,,, w.r.t. LKB 
Proof. This follows from the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 of [3]. There it is shown 
that the schema L 3 1 
WWY)(A(Y) = (A(x) Ax G Y)) 
with A purely existential (the least number principle) admits finite term bases. The 
proof also goes through for universal A, since it is based only on the assumption that 
the quantifier prefix of A consist of one type of quantifier. Now compare L 3, to (sup’) 
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for existential C(z) z (3z)C’(z, t); we expand the definition of B,(x) and shift quanti- 
fiers: 
(WC(4 = (~X)(~YY)C(~Z)(~‘)(C’(Z,Z) 3 z Q y) 
= W4Wz)(C’(z,z) = z 6 X)AX 6 y]. 
We see that in this formulation, B,(x) is a purely universal formula. This form of (sup’) 
is of the same form as L3i (but has an additional premise which does not interfere 
with the proof, and it contains universal instead of existential formulas). 0 
In summary, the same generalization results hold for RCF,,, as for RCF; in 
particular, Krajicek’s question has a positive answer. It does not follow, however, that 
the axioms of RCF are derivable in a fixed number of steps from (sup). 
6. Generalization fails for extensionality 
Finally, we give conditions under which Krajicek’s question must be answered 
negatively for any formulation of the theory of real closed fields: We take a theory 
T with constants 0, 1, functions + and . , and equality axioms, plus the following 
schema of extensionality: 
(Vx)(s(x) = s’(x)) 3 r(s(tJ, . . ..s(t.)) = r(s’(t& . . ..s’(t.)). text) 
This schema is obviously true, so adding it does not change the set of provable 
formulas. It does, under certain assumptions, permit one to add and multiply in 
a fixed number of steps, something which cannot be done in, e.g., RCF alone. 
We assume the following to hold in T: 
(1) TI-a+b=bza=O 
(2) T proves the recursion formulas for addition: 
(a) TFa+O=a 
(b) T Fu + (1 + b) = 1 + (a + b) 
(3) T proves the recursion formulas for multiplication: 
(a) Tt-a.1 =u 
(b) T l-a.(1 + b) = a + (u.b) 








Proposition 6.1. In T + (ext), short addition is possible: 
T + (ext) p {l}” + {l}” = {l}“‘+“. 
M. Barn, R. Zach /Annals qf Pure and Applied Logic 7S (199.5) 3-23 21 
Proof. We use a variant of ~~~u~l~‘.~ Trick [IYJ Consider 
+ ll,((l>‘({qn f {ly), I,},+“) -t ‘.. + $((lf”-‘(fl)” -+” l), (lfm+,), 
L Y J 
3 
B = lj&l({lj~ + (I}“_‘), {l),*“) + *I’ + $((l>m-i({l>” -I- i), {lf”+“, 
By t-i- 2) we have 7’I-{I>” -+ (I + b) = (l>‘((l)” + h), The i-th summand 
$((lfi((l>” + (l>m-i) of B equals the (i + I)-st summand of A. Using (ext), we have 
T t-R = B independently of n and M. On the other hand, we can transform C (using 
(ext) for ~1: -t- 1 = 1 + a, which is provable from (+ 1) and (+ 2) using (ext)) into 
ti/(( 1 fm+‘, ( ljmi”), and subsequently into 0 using ($f and (ext). Using (ext) again for 
(i 1) transforms B’ + 0 to II’. Using (*), we get the desired result, namely D = 0. t-J 
Proaf. We argue as before: 
A 




independent of n). Using (ext), we get A = B, again independently of m and n. On the 
other hand, we can transform C (using (extf for (x I)) into $(fl)“(““-‘) + (i)“, {I>““). 
By Proposition 6.1 we can then prove, inde~ndent~y of m and n, that 
c = $$(ff==, {I]““,_ H ence, we can transform C (by using (tfi) and (ext)) to 0, and 
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finally (again using (+ 1) and (ext)) B’ + 0 to B’. Using (*) and (ext), we get I) = 0, 
which was to be proved. 0 
Note that the ability to multiply arbitrary numbers in fixed length falsifies Kreisel’s 
Conjecture for number theories; cf. [3, p. 431. 
Theorem 6.3. There is a formula ,4(x) s.t. RCF + (ext) & A({I)“) for all n E w, but 
(Vx)A(x) isfalse. 
Proof. Observe that the required properties hold for RCF, a suitable $ is given by 
t&z, b) = a - b. Since RCF + (ext) adds and multiplies in a constant number of 
steps, we can prove in a constant number of steps for each n that 
(1)” = ({ l>Y2 + ({ l}V2 + ({l}‘)” + ({ l}d)2, for some a, b, c, and d, since every natural 
number is the sum of four squares (Lagrange’s theorem). For the latter terms, 
however, t > 0 is certainly provable in a fixed number of steps (independent of 
a, b, c, d), and so we have p {l>” 2 0 for all n E o. If RCF + (ext) would admit 
generalization, (V x) (x 2 0) were provable, which is absurd. 0 
Corollary 6.4. There is no k s.t. RCF (RCF,,, RCF,,,) p Efor utl instances E of(ext) 
(cf Proposition 5.2). 
Proposition 6.5. RCF + (ext) proues {l>” # (1 f” fir n # pn in a c~~stu~t number of steps. 
Proof. W.1.o.g. assume m > n. Then m - n - 1 2 0, and there are a, b, c, d s.t. 
u* + b2 + c* + d2 = m - n - 1. Since (ext) allows short addition and multiplication, 
we can prove (in length independent of m and n) that ({ l>“)” + ((l)b)2 + 
({1}c)2 + ({1}c)2 = {l}m-“-i. RCF proves that a sum of squares is 30, so we have 
{l>“-” > 0. Using short addition on (13”-” + (1)” > (1)” we get (If”’ > (13”. f-J 
7. Conclusion 
All our results relate to theories of specific syntactic forms, which the formulations 
of the real closed fields we have considered also have. The importance of these results 
for the theories of real closed fields themselves i that they give information about the 
relationship between proofs and computations. We give a simple example: If 
Krajicek’s question can be answered positively for T, then it is not possible to 
distinguish quickly between unequal numbers (i.e., T does not prove { 1 l” # {l}” for 
n # m, uniformly within a fixed number of steps). The schema (ext) is strong enough 
for this sort of decision (cf. Proposition 6.5), just like number theories including 
successor induction 
~(O)A(VX)(~(~) 3 A(x + 1)) 3 (t/x)/t(x). 
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(Section 1 of [ll] states that short addition is possible using successor induction. 
Assume m > n: 0 < x + 1 is provable, and therefore 0 < { l}m-” is provable. From 
this we obtain the desired result by short addition.) 
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